Why do we dislike Andy Dalton?
When the Cincinnati Bengals signed their current starting quarterback to a new long-term deal, most of the reaction was negative. In fact, most doesn't really do it justice. It's more like an overwhelming majority. It's hard to find 10 people who have analyzed Dalton closely to come up with the summation that he is a top 10 quarterback. For a 26-year-old, entering his fourth season, who just threw for 33 touchdowns and 4,293 yards in the regular season, Dalton's outlook is exceptionally bleak.
It's easy to see why the common football fan is down on Dalton. He has capitulated in the playoffs three years in a row, compiling one touchdown, six interceptions and a 56.9 percent completion rate with just 718 total yards. Fans primarily judge players on their displays in primetime games because they don't have the time to go through every game and every throw of a season. Analysts generally pay more attention to the season as a whole, but the general consensus from analysts mirrors the general consensus from fans.
Whether it's on a small sample in the post-season or every single game he has played, Dalton's perception is born out of his play on the field. It really is as simple as that.
Raw statistics for a quarterback are worthless on their own. It's as useful as using a photograph of your foot to describe your face. The quarterback is the one player on the field who is directly linked to everyone else who lines up in the same color jersey. He throws the ball to his wide receivers, tight ends and running backs. He gets pass protection from his tight ends, running backs and offensive line. The running backs and the offensive line create balance to keep the defense honest in the running game.
If you squash all of those important details down into just two numbers, 33 and 4,293, you're only viewing a blurry silhouette of something more complex than a pristine Michelangelo painting.
To get an accurate idea of Dalton's worth as a player, we need to take a deeper look at his play on the field. We need to understand his traits, where he excels, where he struggles, how does his offensive coordinator help him, how much do the other players on the field help him. In order to understand what 33 and 4,293 really means for Dalton, we need to understand the circumstances in which that production was created.
This chart tracks every single throw Dalton made during the 2013 season, from Week 1 through the Wild Card Weekend loss to the San Diego Chargers. The result of the play doesn't matter. This chart isn't tracking complete and incomplete passes, it is tracking accurate and inaccurate. Therefore, there will be some receptions that are considered inaccurate throws and some incompletions that will be considered accurate throws. The only pass attempts that don't appear on this chart are Hail Mary attempts, obvious wide receiver-quarterback miscommunications, balls tipped at the line of scrimmage, spikes and intentional throwaways.
For the whole season, Dalton had 160 inaccurate passes and 428 accurate passes. That means he was accurate on 62.6 percent of his qualifying pass attempts. Dalton's actual completion percentage last year was 61.9 percent, so we could argue that he was being hindered by his receivers. However, when this charting method has been used for other quarterbacks(such as Russell Wilson, Tom Brady, Aaron Rodgers and Jay Cutler), the results have consistently been above 70 percent and even 80 percent.
Unlike a quarterback such as Eli Manning, Dalton wasn't asked to consistently make difficult throws down the field as the basis of his offense. Offensive coordinator Jay Gruden did a good job of creating shorter throws and easier offense with throws that didn't even cross the line of scrimmage. What Dalton was asked to do was similar to what Alex Smith was asked to do in Kansas City, but to a slightly less severe degree. Any NFL caliber quarterback should expect to be accurate on at least 70 percent of his passes in this kind of situation.
The overall numbers from this chart don't tell us many specifics about Dalton's play on the field. A better understanding of his talent can be gleaned when you break the chart down into different sections.
The Yellow Section (-10 to 0)
As you would expect of any starting quarterback in the NFL, Dalton is consistently accurate when throwing the ball behind the line of scrimmage. Most of these throws are either screen passes, quick throws to receivers in the flat against off coverage or throws to tight ends after heavy play action to the other side of the field.
According to Pro Football Focus, 12.4 percent of Dalton's passes were screen plays which is significantly higher than the league average of 9.7 percent. The Bengals called 68 screen plays according to PFF, and on 62 of them Dalton completed a pass to a receiver, tight end or running back for 549 yards. That means that the Bengals averaged 8.85 yards per reception on screen plays and 8.07 yards per screen call.
Screen passes aren't difficult to execute and they're an area of the game where the quarterback shouldn't really be given any credit for the result of the play. Dalton executes these plays well, but it's something that every starting quarterback in the league should be able to match. The physical throw the quarterback makes isn't difficult and the success of the play is mostly determined by the YAC ability of the receiver and his blocking. The thing that really stands out for the Bengals is the quality of Giovani Bernard with the ball in his hands and the creativity of offensive coordinator Jay Gruden.
On this play, Green initially lines up to the left side of the field before motioning to the other side behind the line of scrimmage. The Bengals snap the ball when Green is a few yards behind the line of scrimmage and he hasn't stopped moving. He has a receiver close by who picks up the initial block, with two offensive linemen creating a running lane for him on the inside after the play action fake.
This was the most difficult screen pass Dalton had to make last season. He needed to put a trajectory on the ball that would allow it to clear the defender between he and Green but still not force Green to make a difficult reception. Dalton executes this play to perfection.
On this play, Dalton has a very simple throw to execute before Bernard does most of the work. Bernard makes at least five tacklers miss him in the open field and extends a play that should have gained seven or eight yards by 30+ yards. He not only breaks tackles, but he uses his excellent blocking from his teammates. These are the kinds of big plays that take a huge amount of pressure off of the quarterback because he doesn't have to do anything difficult.
On this play, none of Bernard's blocking is executed down the field. Multiple defenders have a chance to get to him, but he initially uses his acceleration to escape down the sideline before spinning infield to avoid another tackle. Once again, Dalton's role was limited and easily executed.
By not only having one specific player who can be dangerous on screen passes and by not focusing on one particular type of screen, the Bengals were able to constantly keep the defense off balance with these kinds of throws. Not every team in the league will use bubble screens, running back screens, wide receiver screens, tight end screens, slot screens, two wide receiver screens on one play and screens after play action all as part of the same offense.
While Gruden excelled with his screen passes, he did overuse his bootleg play action passes. They still helped Dalton on a regular basis, but Dalton also had to make some tough throws under pressure into the flat.
This play is a great example of the execution that the Bengals could boast on offense. The play fake is perfectly carried out to drag the linebackers to the left side of the offense, before Dalton breaks back towards the right side. While Dalton is turning to face his running back, his running back has already recognized that he needs to pick up the edge rusher coming from the other side. This alertness from BenJarvus Green-Ellis lessens the effect of the play fake, but keeps the pressure off of Dalton when he turns around.
Jermaine Gresham has an important role here. Gresham ultimately catches the ball in the flat, but that comes after he initially sold his blocking on the edge of the offensive line. He didn't immediately escape into his route, he initiated contact with the defender and held it for a moment first.
Gresham is also forced to adjust to an underthrown pass from Dalton. Because he has to wait on the ball, he is unable to run down the sideline for the first down, so instead he cuts back infield for an eight-yard gain. Much like the screen passes this is the kind of play that takes the pressure off of the quarterback and allows the offense to stay on the field with easy first downs.
The Blue Section (1 to 10)
Easy first downs are a part of Gruden's offense. He understands how to scheme receivers open with how they line up and route combinations. On this play, Dalton again has an easy throw to Mohamed Sanu because of how the offense around him executes.
This play actually takes place just a few plays after the Gresham example from above. The key to this play is the Down-And-Distance, 3rd-and-4, and the bunch of receivers to the bottom of the screen. Even though there are only two wide receivers to that side, they are tight to the formation with a tight end in close proximity. As they so often do, these bunch formations force the defense to back off to avoid being caught in the traffic that is created by the receivers releasing into their routes.
Mohamed Sanu is the outside receiver. A.J. Green is the inside receiver. Jermaine Gresham is the tight end. At the snap, the inside defensive back squares off to Green but doesn't follow him when he goes into his route, instead he is focused on Sanu. This is the ideal way to avoid being trapped at the release point because the defensive back is able to keep both receivers in his line of vision and react to any movement either receiver makes. Green doesn't look to initiate contact with the defender, so he relaxes into his coverage on Sanu.
What the defender didn't account for was Gresham coming across to take him out from his tight end spot. By keeping Gresham tighter to the formation instead of splitting him wide so he was closer to the receivers, it was tougher for the defense to consider him as a picker on this play. The knock-on effect of this is that Sanu has to alter his route. Sanu is running a crossing route, but he can't immediately attack the space that he is given because he needs to wait for Gresham to clean out the defensive backs.
Therefore, he starts his route, then hesitates before he gets to the line of scrimmage to allow Gresham to go past him. Both Gresham and Sanu perfectly execute this subtle combination.
Sanu is wide open and Dalton has a clean pocket to just loft the ball towards him. He gets a simple first down.
This is the area of the field where Dalton is at his best. He understands how to throw receivers open over the middle of the field and he can throw with anticipation to find receivers against zone coverage in this area. As the above chart shows, a large percentage of his passes to this area of the field go outside of the numbers. That is because Gruden's offense features lots of short curl routes that allow Dalton to find receivers underneath against off coverage.
There are plenty of throws where Dalton shows off his awareness of the incoming defender and leads his receiver either towards the sideline or infield to pull him away from an impending hit, but there are too many occasions where his passes lost velocity or were inaccurate to this area.
On this play, Marvin Jones gets credited with a drop. It's a drop on a pass that Jones should have caught, but a pass that didn't help his receiver at all. From this kind of distance in a clean pocket, Dalton should be throwing the ball on a rope at chest level. The ball should arrive as soon as Jones turns around. Instead, Jones is forced to wait on the ball as it lofts towards him and arrives high above his head. He is forced to reach up for it and expose himself to an impending hit from the defense.
Jones gets credited with the drop and the throw is likely marked down as "catchable" by most onlookers, but by every realistic measure that takes into account what happens on the field, it's a bad pass.
Inaccurate passes that die at the end to this area of the field afford defensive backs with good ball skills the opportunities for turnovers. Turnovers on these kinds of plays often end up in the end zone because there aren't offensive players in position to recover ground with a player whose momentum is already carrying them forward.
Now, you may be wondering why I focused on the negative in an area where Dalton had a lot of green. The context of this section in relation to the rest of his pass chart is important. Dalton was good enough in this area to boast about his ability here if he had a consistent and effective deep ball, but that is not the case. Without the deep ball, this section was just the best of a bad group, rather than a passable effort to complement better work elsewhere.
The Blue Area (11 to 20)
Dalton isn't much of an intermediate thrower. Most of his attempts in this area come on deeper curl routes or throws down the sideline to A.J. Green. Over the middle of the field, Dalton regularly didn't need to be accurate as he just had to throw a catchable pass in the vicinity of Tyler Eifert, Gresham, Jones or Sanu. One consistent aspect of the Bengals offense is the impressive play of its receivers at the catch point.
Eifert and Jones in particular excel at quickly recognizing the flight of the football and adjusting to it in the air. They don't need precision passes like most players who play their positions because they are hands catchers who don't fear contact with wide wingspans and the athleticism to create separation. It's rare for a team to find one receiver with their kind of ability, the Bengals have at least three when you add in Green.
By regularly forcing his receivers to make unnecessarily difficult receptions and by missing many more opportunities completely, Dalton proved to be a very ineffective passer when he was asked to push the ball past 10 yards down the field. When he was asked to push the ball past 20 yards down the field, it got even worse.
The Orange Area (21+)
One of the first things you should notice on this chart is how many passes Dalton threw out of bounds. This is a reflection of his lack of arm strength, and the lack of comfort that causes, when he needs to force the ball further down the field than he is realistically capable of. Dalton missed a huge amount of throws here, but the more worrying aspect is that his accuracy was actually worse than these charts reflect.
It's very difficult for these charts to judge a jump ball situation or a play where a receiver makes an incredible read on the ball in the air. This becomes more of an issue on deep balls because the receiver has more time to react to the ball after it is thrown. Because the quarterback is essentially throwing to a general area rather than to his target, a huge emphasis is put on the receiver's ability in these scenarios.
When you're throwing to A.J. Green, you're going to be made to look like a more impressive passer than you actually are. Even though Green had a few too many drops in 2013, he also made a phenomenal number of impressive plays on inaccurate passes from Dalton.
More than any other, this play shows how Dalton's ability doesn't match his production.
This is an 82-yard touchdown pass. There shouldn't be anything unimpressive about it. However, Dalton's pass dies in mid air. After running the play fake, he turns around, reads the defense and puts all his effort into unleashing a ball deep down the sideline. He throws it far enough for Green to catch ti, but Green not only has to wait on it, he has to turn around and work back to the ball before breaking a tackle and turning back towards the endzone.
Green completely destroyed the coverage with his route, he should have had an easy reception. He should have been able to run underneath the ball without breaking stride and waltz into the end zone. Instead he is forced to make an incredibly impressive play to bail out his quarterback. If Dalton had been throwing to a different wide open receiver in this scenario, one who wasn't one of the very best in the NFL, this would have been an incompletion.
This is the moment when Dalton is throwing the ball and Green is in behind the defense. The ball should already be gone and when it is thrown it should be pushed further downfield towards the sideline. Dalton simply doesn't have the arm strength to push it that far downfield.
A Week 1 pass to Green working against Charles Tillman resulted in a huge pass interference penalty, but it should have been much worse.
On this play, you could give Dalton credit for attacking a matchup by throwing the ball towards Green in a one-on-one situation against Tillman. However, if Dalton was attacking the matchup and throwing a jump ball, the pass should have been pushed closer to the sideline and further down the field. Instead, Dalton throws it to a spot where Tillman should have a good chance at intercepting the ball if he turns his head around. Instead, the cornerback interferes with Green and plays the route terribly. Green works through Tillman's contact and acrobatically gets underneath the ball to give himself an opportunity to catch the touchdown.
The throw was too far infield and to a covered receiver. It's the kind of throw that should regularly result in an interception and its success is reliant on mistakes from the defense rather than execution from the offense.
Being a deep ball lofter means that you can't throw receivers open down the field, you can't hit receivers in stride on a regular basis and you are more reliant on receivers making tough receptions. By not being able to throw accurately down the field, your value for creating this production is lessened. It's much easier to find a quarterback who can throw the ball like Dalton does than receivers who can find the football as well as the Bengals receivers do.
Being a deep ball lofter rather than a deep ball thrower makes you less valuable as an individual. You are reliant on your receivers to consistently make very difficult catches and you are the more easily replaced piece of the puzzle.
This way of throwing the ball is a big reason why the Bengals receivers get blamed for so many drops. Like pass attempts, not all catches and drops are created equal. On these two plays, the receivers do incredibly well to beat the defensive back to the ball initially, even if they can't make the reception.
Because Andy Dalton is a replacement level talent at the quarterback position, he will never be celebrated with others who produce his kind of fantasy points. Furthermore, his production is less likely to remain consistent because he is reliant on the rest of his offense to carry him rather than he be the instigator for positive plays.
Dalton is a physically limited quarterback who makes too many mental errors and can't consistently throw with precision. Because we don't really judge quarterbacks as individuals, but rather as individuals within their supporting casts, Dalton will always be perceived as better than below average and his production will likely reflect that.
Yet, aside from being better at sustaining his eye level when under pressure in the pocket, Dalton does very little on the field to differentiate between he and Ryan Fitzpatrick.