How to Ruin Your Team in Two Easy Steps
I’ve been playing fantasy football for nearly 15 years now, and this is my 8th year playing in dynasty leagues. My oldest dynasty league is a 10-teamer, and I am the two-time defending champion.
As of the championship game last year, my roster consisted of Drew Brees, Nick Foles, Jamaal Charles, Adrian Peterson, Le’Veon Bell, Ray Rice, Demaryius Thomas, Randall Cobb, Percy Harvin, Michael Crabtree, Larry Fitzgerald, Rob Gronkowski, Julius Thomas, Jordan Reed, and San Francisco’s defense, (we don’t use kickers, because kickers in dynasty are the worst idea ever). I also owned four first-round picks in the upcoming rookie draft, (#3, #5, #6, and #10).
A funny thing happened on the way to my three-peat, though. This offseason I decided that, rather than leave well enough, I was going to tinker. It started when I traded Demaryius Thomas and the #5 and #6 rookie picks for Calvin Johnson and a 2015 1st rounder. I figured Calvin would improve my title odds in the short term, and I wanted to load up on ammunition for the RB-rich 2015 draft.
Then I doubled down. In an effort to diversify my holdings, I acquired some players who I was much lower than the dynasty consensus on. In a single blockbuster trade, I acquired Cordarrelle Patterson, Michael Floyd, Keenan Allen, and Ladarius Green, (as well as a 2015 first rounder from a team that had historically been drafting at the top of the round). All I had to give up was… Le’Veon Bell, Randall Cobb, Julius Thomas, and my #10 rookie pick.
The results of this stunning display of trading incompetence? According to points per game in my scoring system, I sold the #4 running back, #2 and #5 wide receivers, and the #1 tight end. Out of the stunning windfall I received, only one player ranks among the top 20 at his position; Calvin Johnson, who checks in at 20th on the nose. And that supposedly-high 2015 draft pick I traded for? It currently projects to be the last pick in the round, as the owner, (fueled by the trio of studs I sent to him), has the best record in the league and leads in points scored.
And my team? Jamaal Charles and Calvin Johnson got hurt, Adrian Peterson and Ray Rice got suspended, Percy Harvin got traded, Nick Foles and Drew Brees regressed, and I am currently 2nd-to-last in the standings and in total points scored.
This is shaping up like a pretty standard warning about the dangers of trading, except here comes the twist: you know that roster I mentioned? I traded for almost all of it. Drew Brees and Nick Foles? Acquired in trade. Adrian Peterson, Jamaal Charles, and Ray Rice, too. Demaryius Thomas, Percy Harvin, Michael Crabtree, and Larry Fitzgerald were all traded for. So was Rob Gronkowski. Even San Francisco’s Defense was once a trade throw-in.
In fact, of the 128 players I started last year (8 starters a week x 16 weeks played), 97 of them were players I received via trade— over 75%! And that percentage understates the matter; of the 31 “home-grown” starts, 14 went to players I picked up on waivers to cover for byes or injuries.
For those not doing the math at home, just 17 of the 128 starts— 13.3%!— went to players I had drafted at some point in the previous 8 years. Julius Thomas— a former 3rd round rookie pick— accounted for 8 of them, Randall Cobb tallied 5, Le’Veon Bell had 3, and Stephen Hill managed to sneak in for 1 start. And while that number would have surely been higher had Cobb stayed healthy, Thomas and Bell never would have seen the field if not for injuries to Rob Gronkowski and Adrian Peterson.
In other words, if it wasn’t for risky trades I would be the odds-on favorite to earn my third straight championship this year. On the other hand, if it wasn’t for risky trades, I never would have won the last two titles in the first place.
And that brings me to my point. No one wins every trade. I consider myself a very accomplished trader- and the roster I assembled, I feel, speaks for itself. With that said, I have some truly atrocious trades in my history. In addition to the ones mentioned, I once traded Pierre Garcon and Miles Austin for Donald Driver. I gave Chris Johnson and Antonio Gates for Larry Fitzgerald. I traded Brandon Marshall and a future first rounder for Percy Harvin in 2012 just weeks before Harvin got injured. In perhaps my worst move ever, I gave Demaryius Thomas and A.J. Green for Maurice Jones-Drew and a 1st in 2012. (Yes, I’ve traded away Demaryius Thomas twice- to the same owner both times, actually. Demaryius has gone on quite the journey in our league.)
I've also had some brilliant trades to salvage my record. I traded Josh Freeman and a 2013 first for Adrian Peterson when he was still working his way back from injury. I got Rob Gronkowski for Maurice Jones-Drew right before the wheels fell off. After his ACL tear, I received Jamaal Charles and a 2013 first, (which wound up being #3), for Jermichael Finley and the #10 and #11 pick in 2012. Nick Foles was acquired for Jonathan Dwyer. Over the years I have gotten a 1st rounder for James Jones, two first rounders for Ben Tate, Lee Evans, and Stevie Johnson, and a 1st rounder for BenJarvus Green-Ellis and the New York Jets version of LaDainian Tomlinson. And just after I botched everything with those first two trades this offseason, I shipped off Michael Crabtree, Larry Fitzgerald, Ladarius Green, and Ray Rice for Julio Jones, Joique Bell, and Frank Gore.
That’s how trading works. Some trades become massive wins. Others become massive losses. Rarely, trades become break-even propositions. It’s easy, with the benefit of hindsight, to say I should have left well enough alone this offseason… but if I were the type of person who left well enough alone, I never would have built that team in the first place. It’s hard to build a juggernaut by just adding a couple players a year in the draft and waivers. Sometimes you have to roll the dice.
Fear of Failure is, In Itself, Failure
Imagine a monkey is presented with two games. In one game, the monkey is given a grape and then flips a coin to see if he wins a second grape. In the other game, the monkey is given two grapes and flips a coin to see if one of those grapes is taken away. The outcome of both games is identical- the monkey has a 50% chance of getting one grape, and a 50% chance of getting two grapes.
Despite the identical outcomes, the monkey would far prefer the first game, where the presence or absence of the grape was framed as a potential gain, over the second game, where the presence or absence of the second grape was framed as a potential loss. This isn’t just a hypothetical, either: there are scientists who devote themselves to flipping coins, handing out grapes, and observing the results.
This same preference exists in humans, too, and is commonly called “loss aversion”. People would like to avoid losses and people would like to make gains, which is perfectly rational. Their preference for avoiding losses, however, is twice as strong as their preference for making gains. That’s not rational. Losing $5 affects someone as strongly as winning $10.
Loss aversion, (and its cousin, risk aversion), is one of the most potent discouragers of trades. Basically, the perceived potential for gain needs to be twice as great as the perceived potential for loss in order for most owners to engage in a trade.
Examples of this are quite easy to provide observationally. Recently on Twitter I asked whether any Sammy Watkins owners would trade him for Alshon Jeffery, and whether any Alshon Jeffery owners would trade him for Sammy Watkins. One of the most common responses I received was that people would not trade Watkins for Jeffery or Jeffery for Watkins. One respondent said that he would not trade either receiver unless he got the other one… plus a second rounder.
On its face, this makes no sense- either Watkins is preferred, however slightly, or else Jeffery is preferred, however slightly. With the concept of loss aversion, however, it makes perfect sense. Owners are more worried about making the swap and being wrong than they are excited about making the swap and being right.
As I demonstrated at the top, if you’re afraid of being wrong about a trade, you shouldn’t trade. Being wrong is going to happen. It’s part of the cost of doing business. Even if you restrict yourself only to “no-brainer” trades, you’ll still often be wrong.
For instance, the trade where I gave Bell, Cobb, and Thomas for Allen, Floyd, Patterson, and Green was universally praised when I made it. I heard back from dozens of owners, and every single one preferred the side I got, most by a significant margin. The words “steal” were tossed around quite a bit. The fact that the consensus on those players was so high was the reason I acquired them in the first place.
A few months later, the landscape looks pretty different. There is a lot of football left to be played, but if I had the chance, I would reverse that deal in a heartbeat. I promise you, it kills me that I made it. It keeps me up at nights. It’s not like I’m somehow immune to loss aversion— I promise I’m as human as most of the rest of you, prone to the exact same faulty reasoning.
Still, I know before I ever step up to the plate that by taking a lot of big swings I’m going to wind up with a lot of big misses. At the same time, I make an effort to acknowledge my fear and move past it, because I know that if I never swing, I’ll never get any hits, either.
A Pessimist's Argument For Trading
I don’t expect most owners to take trading to quite the extreme that I do. In my oldest league, there are currently three players on my entire 30-man roster that I personally drafted (Ben Roethlisberger, who I took in the 2007 startup, plus Jonathan Stewart and Mike Evans). This despite the fact that I have hoarded first round draft picks, owning three in 2011, four in 2012, four in 2013, and four in 2014. I currently own four first rounders in 2015, too.
Why do I take trading to such an extreme? For me, it’s simple math. I believe that I am an above-average trader. How much above average is open to interpretation, but I do believe that, across all of my trades, the average result is a net win.
If that’s the case— if trades, on average, produce positive value for me— it only makes sense to maximize the number of trades I make. If each trade provides just a measly 5% return, on average, then by the time I have made 15 trades I have more than doubled my value.
Knowing the simple math behind it, I choke down my loss aversion and put myself out there for trades as much as I can. There are limits, of course- if I start accepting worse offers and engage in trading for its own sake, I will no longer be an above-average trader. And if you’re not an above-average trader, there’s little you can do that will more devastate your team than engaging in a lot of trades. Consider the math from the flip side. If I lose an average of 5% on each trade I make, then by the time I execute 14 trades, I will be left with less than half of my initial starting value.
This is why I wrote this offseason about the power of knowing what you know. This is why I rely so heavily on concepts like cognitive bias and market inefficiency. If I know that there’s an area where, due to predictable structural inefficiencies, assets are almost certainly going to be mispriced, then engaging in trades in that area offers safer returns. I'm less likely to destroy my own team in the process.
Injured players are consistently undervalued for a variety of reasons. Future rookie picks are consistently undervalued during the season. I can focus my efforts on these “safe” areas, maintain decent profit margins, and compound them over an absurd number of trades.
Likewise, if you feel like you can find areas where there are safe profits to be made, you should make every effort to cram down your loss aversion and trade as often as possible. Don’t let the fear of inevitable failure hold you back; there are dynasties to be built.
